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Be English-friendly or any other language-friendly means that UC is taught in a language but can either of the
following conditions:
1. There are support materials in English / other language;
2. There are exercises, tests and exams in English / other language;
3. There is a possibility to present written or oral work in English / other language.
1
6.0
0.0 h/sem
30.0 h/sem
0.0 h/sem
0.0 h/sem
0.0 h/sem
0.0 h/sem
1.0 h/sem
31.0 h/sem
119.0 h/sem
0.0 h/sem
150.0 h/sem
Since year
2018/2019
Pre-requisites
Knowledge of intermediate microeconomic theory, calculus (optimization) and basic probability theory.
Objectives
The main goal of the course is to present the foundations of modern game theory and contract theory. It also aims to stimulate economic reasoning in students through the discussion of examples of specific markets.
Program
1. Noncooperative game theory 1.1. Strategic-form games 1.2. Extensive-form games 1.3. Games with incomplete information 2. Incentives and contracts 2.1. Adverse selection 2.2. Signalling 2.3. Moral hazard
Evaluation Method
Periodic evaluation includes the following elements: - problem set (40%) - written exam in the end of the term (60%). To pass the course, the mark of each of the written exams cannot be below 7.5 pts. The final evaluation is carried out through a final exam (100%).
Teaching Method
The classes will include lectures and practice. The lectures have the main goal of presenting to the students concepts and models of game and contract theory as well as applications. The practice part of the classes is meant for conceptual discussions of models and papers and problem solving. Tutoring hours (OT) allow students to clarify specific problems.
Observations
-
Basic Bibliographic
- Tadelis, S. (2013). Game Theory: An Introduction. Princeton University Press. - Salanié, B. (2005). The Economics of Contracts: A Primer (2nd revised). MIT Press.
Complementar Bibliographic
Advanced Microeconomics: - Gravelle, H., & Rees, R. (2004). Microeconomics (3rd ed.). Prentice-Hall. - Jehle, G. A., & Reny, P. J. (2011). Advanced Microeconomic Theory (3rd ed.). Financial Times/ Prentice Hall. - Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.
Game Theory: - Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory. MIT Press. - Gibbons, Robert (1992), A Primer in Game Theory, Pearson Education. - Maschler, M., Solan, E., & Zamir, S. (2013). Game Theory. Cambridge University Press. - Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A. (1994). A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press.
Contract Theory: - Bolton, P., & Dewatripont, M. (2004). Contract Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press - Macho-Stadler, I., & Perez-Castrillo, J. D. (2001). An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
